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         Abstracts
Decline in public interest to “pure” economic theory is disturbing fact. This 
paper  considers  the  main  macroeconomic  hypothesis  through  their 
implementation in practice - macroeconomic policies in the USA, in  post-soviet 
countries (Russia and Georgia) and Turkey as well. Stabilization policy of these 
countries experiences that governments combine keynesian discretionary policy 
and classical rules. The so-called economic stabilization programs for Russia, 
Georgia and Turkey sponsored by the IMF have led to absolutely different and not 
always positive results. In particular, Russia overcame recession and financial 
crises of 1998 without IMF loan. Georgia now is looking for the new program. The 
programs were faulted because they did not take into consideration all peculates of 
post-communist economies.    Most successful this program was in Turkey that 
has achieved macroeconomic stability and high rate of growth.
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Introduction
Talks about economic crisis in Georgia are no longer on the agenda. 
Theoretical economy has automatically dropped out of our economic reality. Such 
an ignorance has not brought any benefits to anyone. On the contrary, economic 
history provides us a lot of examples, when new ideas, new theories have pulled 
many countries out of the vicious cycle of recession. The most obvious example is 
Keynesian theory of employment, which enabled the world economy to overcome 
the Great Depression of 1930s.
Stagflation  or the Great Inflation of 70s has brought to life monetarism 
which continues to be the most widespread   theoretical concept up until now. 
Other  concepts  such  as  evolutionary  theory,  theory  of  organizations, 
institutionalism (the theory of rational and adaptive expectations), supply-side 
hypothesis  are being actively developed side by side with the abovementioned 
concepts. We wouldn't consider the basic postulates of these theories and their 
“weak” and “strong” sides. Let's emphasis  that  “apriori” none of them could be 
applied entirely to our economy under the following circumstances. 
Firstly,  in  contrast  to  Reagan,  who  had  realized  in  “Reaganomics” 
program the ideas of supply-side economics, modern governments in developed 
countries prefer to pursue more flexible macroeconomic policies based on several 
theories that at one glass  seem to be conflict. 
As we know,  in the U.S.A new Keynesians are called “Activists” and their 
opponents are monetarists who present new classical school. In the   latter's 
opinion,  the  Activist  policy  should  be  replaced  by  certain  long-term  rules, 
concerning with regulation of  the money supply, national income, price level, and 
other  rules of fiscal  and monetary policy.
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implemented any of the suggested rules of economic policy. Moreover, the FED 
adopted  the discretionary monetary policy. But at the same time the FED sets 
planned targets that limit main parameters of the money supply and  the volume of 
loaning for each year .These targets do not have to be realized compulsorily.
On the other hand, the FED makes prognoses of major economic variables 
such as nominal and real GDP, deflator GDP, unemployment rate and etc. to 
predict and control the rate of growth of monetary aggregates. The FED agrees that 
time lags and mistakes of prognosis make     the “precise adjustment” of the 
economy problematically. At the same time, it doubts that all suggested rules of the 
economic policy, even if they are flexible, can be equally useful and effective in all 
circumstances.  The  FED  emphasizes  that  it  is  necessary  to  preserve    the 
mechanisms of backward relations,  logic, and weighted discretionary approach 
toward  monetary policy, that aims at the solution of long-term problems.
Secondly, according to the  theory of  economic policy, developed  by  
Dutch economist Y.Tinbergen, successful  macroeconomic policy  should include 
a sequence of   steps .First of all, it is necessary to choose   the objectives of 
monetary policy or the goals, then find a set of variables to aim them (intermediate 
targets). After that, governments have to estimate which political and economic 
instruments they possess (operating targets). And finally, they must have a model 
of the economy, that relates targets  with the instruments.  For example, if the 
major  goal of  society is inflation, then orthodox restrictive methods proposed by 
monetarists are effective. These methods include: stabilization of the exchange 
rate, balanced budget, strict monetary policy. Such programs have been already 
widely implemented in many countries including Georgia. If society decides that 
the growth of real GDP is on the agenda, tools of the keynesian expansionary fiscal 
policy are more suitable. It is not accidental that at  threshold of  cyclical decline 
George Bush administration  decided  to lower taxes and extended “Star Wars” 
program. Because innovations would created incentives for the development of 
new technologies, that were the main sources of  economic growth in the United 
States in recent years.
Thirdly, international practice of stabilization policies experiences that 
the same program implemented in different countries may cause different results. 
For instance,     in Argentina (Austrakh plan in 1985), Brazil (Crusado plan in 
1986), and Peru (Inti plan in 1985) heterodox shock program   failed. On the 
contrary, in Israel and Mexico heterodox methods that included wage  and price 
control  were  implemented  with  a  great  success.  Both  countries  curbed  high 
inflation and achieved quite enduring stabilization.
  More familiar to us examples are “Shock therapy” programs in Poland and 
Russia. This policy promised to provide stabilization in an economy through price 
liberalization, first of all. In Russia at     the beginning of this process prices 
increased ten and even thousand times, but stabilization did not occur. Another 
component of the reform was privatization, aimed to rapid increase in economic 
efficiency of production. However, in Russia in the course of the reform there was 
a dramatic collapse and decline in economic activities and production efficiency   
(for example, labor productivity declined almost by 37%). Russian economists 
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have  rivals  in  economic  history  of  the  country  in  peaceful  time.  The  next 
component of the reform - wage control -  caused crucial social problems such as 
mass unemployment, sharp decrease in real wage and enlarge   the portion of 
people with incomes below minimum subsistence level . “Shock therapy” in 
Russia turned into a shock without therapy and default of Russian economy in 
1998.
Fourthly,  reasons and  nature of recession (in our opinion, it is more 
correct to talk about depression) in post communist economies were absolutely 
different from those in Western countries. More specifically, it is a crisis of 
transition economy. As  Y.Kornai predicted in his book “Deficit”, the dismantling 
of  planned  economy  and  it  liberalization  were  insufficient  to  form    market 
economy.
According  to  Jeffrey  D.Sachs,  any  stabilization  program  for  post 
communist economy must  take into consideration the following peculiarities that 
has existed:
 soft budget limitation of public enterprises or, in other words, a lot of privileges 
to them in form of cheap credit, direct subsidies, tax benefits,  etc. Such a 
financial regime protected public enterprises from market competition and the 
threat of bankruptcy.
 weak wage control in public enterprises. In socialist economy profit was not  an 
indicator of economic efficiency, managers cared only about accomplishment 
of plan, because wage and fringes depended on total product.
 large amount of transfer payments .It's a fact that socialism had created a high 
level of social security. But with  ineffective economic system such a policy 
had inevitably led to substantial budget deficit and high inflation.
 “Monetary Shade” resulting of excessive purchasing power of population. 
Such a situation occurred because of excessive money supply, on one hand, and 
a system of controlled prices, on another. Under such conditions inflationary 
pressure on the economy was very high.
In our opinion, this list of peculiarities of transition economies should be 
extended to develop a successful stabilization program.
 Transition economy inherits from socialism a high level of monopolization in 
most industries of economy. In market economy monopoly emerges as a result 
of decline or restrict in competition while under communism monopoly as 
usual was a result of government policy.
 The majority of post communist countries suffer from corruption, which infects 
all spheres of social life, including economy. In corrupted economy market 
mechanism of   distribution   of internal resources   and received   external 
assistance works in modified way. Corruption increases total costs and price 
level. Underground    economy becomes an inseparable part of this economic 
system and it   accounts  half and more of country's  GDP.  Underground 
economy and corruption destroy the state  budget.
 As  we  have  mentioned  above,  in  most  post  communist  countries  strong 
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appears and banking system operates ineffectively, because most part of the 
money supply circulates outside the banks.
It is also necessary to include into consideration  the results of globalization 
process. In epoch of globalization national governments  lose some of their 
functions  of  macroeconomic  regulation  of  an  economy  to  expense  of 
international organizations which, for instance,  finance most  of stabilization 
programs.
  The common characteristic of  all stabilization programs is their short-
term targeting. Short-term targets are slightly connected to the long-term goals. 
Most of these programs are aimed to conquering the persistent high inflation and 
the  associated  macroeconomic  instability.  However,  these  measures  are  not 
enough  to  the    restoration  of    the  potential of    transition  economy  in  post 
depression period. It is not surprising, that in many countries where such programs 
have been carried out the consequence was an economy that lurched from crisis to 
crisis. A familiar example is Turkey.
Turkey  began  a  series  of  reforms  in  the  1980s  designed  to  shift  the 
economy from an insulated system to a more private-sector, market based model. 
The reform spurred solid growth that has been punctuated by sharp recession and 
financial crises  in 1994, 1999, and 2001. From 1999 to 2002 government restarted 
structural reforms in line with ongoing economic programs developed with the 
IMF. The programs included passage of social reform, public finance  reform, state 
banks reform, banking sector reform, increasing transparency in public sector, and 
also introduction of related legislation to liberalize telecom and energy markets. 
Under the IMF program, the government also sought to use exchange rate policies 
to curb inflation.
In 2000 a growing current account deficit, the weak banking system, and 
growing concerns over the failure to implement needed structural reforms resulted 
in a liquidity crisis that led to a revised IMF program. In February 2001 there was a 
dramatic increase in interest rates and as a result rapid inflation, a severe banking 
crises, a massive rise in domestic public debt, and a deep economic downturn 
(GNP fell by 9,5% in2001).The government was forced to float the lira and adopt a 
more ambitious economic reform program, including  tight fiscal policy, enhanced 
structural reforms, and unprecedented levels of IMF lending. These reforms 
enabled Turkey to stabilize interest rates and the currency and to meet its debt 
obligations. In 2002 and 2003, the reforms began to show results. Inflation and 
interest rate have fallen significantly, the currency has stabilized, and confidence 
has begun to return.
In  recent  years  Turkey  demonstrated  strong  economic  performance  and 
progress has been striking. The numbers speak for themselves. Average real GNP 
growth over the last three years has been closed to 8% and last year it was just short 
of 10% (compare with average growth of 2,3% between 1995-2001). Even more 
remarkable, that acceleration in growth has been achieved in the context of sharply 
declining inflation and fiscal consolidation. The inflation rate has fallen from 70% 
three years ago, to close 8% now  its lowest level for 35 years. The primary surplus 
?
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fallen by 30% of GNP since the peak in 2001. Thus, the most impressive result of 
the Turkish  reform is sharp decline in inflation that has been achieved in the 
context of rapid growth. Both IMF and Turkish government explain this recovery 
as a result of “successful crisis management”.
Macroeconomic stability and high growth rate have already made possible 
raise  in real income and help to reduce poverty. The last has a special meaning in 
Turkey. Because unmentioned reality behind the growth and deflation was that the 
unprecedented appreciation of the new Turkish lira resulted in sharp reductions in 
real wages and a dramatic increase of the surplus value extracted from the working 
class .Between March 2001 and June 2003 a nominal wage increased of 82,6% and 
the consumer price index jumped by 121,2%. In January 2003 the Turkish trade 
unions accepted another deal that eroded real wage for 2003-2004. According to 
this agreement, the lump-sum increase for the first half of 2003 meant 6-7% 
average increase in wages. In the same period, the consumer price index rose 
another 12%. 
A report recently prepared by the Turkish government reveals that one out of 
every four Turkish citizens is living below the poverty line, while 82% of them are 
not covered by security system. The report also reveals that only 48% of the 
country's total workforce is covered by social security network.
The recent transformation of the Turkish economy has been remarkable. There 
is every reason to expect further rapid growth, sustainable over a long period. That 
will raise real incomes, deliver rising living standards and further reduce poverty.  
 On May 12 2005, Turkey signed    a new arrangement with  the IMF that is 
intended to support a three year economic program that aims to sustain growth, 
deliver price stability, and more towards convergence with the EU economies. The 
prospect of EU membership has certainty focused thinking on the further progress 
needed. On another hand,  prospective EU membership adds additional bonus to 
economic progress.  
Stabilization programs of the IMF have been realized in Turkey since 1961, the 
last of which was carried out in 1999 when the country received $4 billion and 
recommendations of the Fund concerning planned devaluation of   Turkish Lira by 
means of moving to a new system of the Exchange rate  the system of “Crawling “ 
tying. This resulted in a bank crisis on December 2000. A new provision of $7.5 
billion and an advice to speed up privatization followed. By the beginning of 2001 
country faced with the currency crisis. The IMF applied a new remedy  the system 
of floating exchange rates. Turkish Lira totally lost its value. GNP decreased by 
8.5% and inflation boosted. More than a million of Turks have lost their jobs. In 
May 2001 IMF provided $8 billion more. In autumn of 2001 a new crisis occurred 
in Turkey and the Fund promised to provide extra $12 billion in case if the tax 
reform aimed at the expansion of the tax basis by means of increasing taxes proved 
to be successful. More and more economists attribute temporary “rests” in Turkish 
crisis not to unstable movement of the economy towards the recovery, but to the 
waiting of a successive assistance of the IMF. Such an euphony has also taken 
place in Argentina which has recently become sadly famous for its endless changes 
of the presidents. One of the reasons is that the efforts of the economists and 
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begging of financial assistance. The debt of Argentina exceeds established by the 
Fund quota by 529% and that of Turkey by 1500%.
In 2002-2004 an analogical economic program was accepted. According to the 
authors, its realization will make it possible to prevent future crises by preserving 
the basis for fixed and long-term economic growth. The program includes three 
key elements:
 Preservation of the floating exchange rate to limit the possibility of potential 
speculators attacks, stabilize percentage level.
 Continuation of the reforms of financial system and strengthening of the trust 
towards internal national financial assets.
 Reforms concerning taxes and expenditures which will help to settle fiscal debt 
at a certain time.
Besides this, the structural reforms already initiated in three regions will be 
carried on:
 In banking sphere, to direct investment sources toward the real sector od the 
economy.
 In governmental sector, to increase the transparency of the government activity 
and to reorganize enterprises.
 In private sector, to speed up privatization and to stimulate the inflow of foreign 
direct investments.
Conclusion
The first half of 2002 will be crucial, for it will illustrate the “Authenticity” of 
stabilization achieved within a country: whether so-called “critical point” in 
reforms has been passed. However many Turkish economists doubt in the success 
of this program being afraid of debt crisis or crisis of credibility. In this relation 
economic reforms in Russia are attracting greater interest. Russia has refused the 
assistance of the IMF and, moreover, has decreased taxes (In Russia per-capita tax 
of 13% was used, which was the lowest in Europe). The Ruble has been stabilized. 
The country implements policy supporting export and, furthermore, it has applied 
for entering WTO under beneficial for itself conditions   with a perspective to 
become  a  world  market  supplier  of  weapons,  color  metals,  steel,  chemical 
products, etc., everything what the West did not permit it to sell because of 
“Undemocracy”. A favorable investment climate emerges in Russia where real 
and not “Mafia” investments are directed.
A quick glance at Russian reforms convinces that a precisely thought over 
combination of simulative fiscal and mildly strict credit-monetary policies is 
effective under conditions of Transitional economy as they create real grounds for 
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